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STUDENT ARTICLES
LEGALLY TRUE BUT MISLEADING STATEMENTS:
A MORAL DILEMMA
R. JOHN KUEHN III*
INTRODUCTION
Let justice be done-that is, for my client let justice be
done-though the heavens fall.1
Scholars of legal ethics are nearly unanimous in the belief
that "lawyers lost the persuasion of their ancestors that the pro-
fession possess other responsibilities than those owing to their
clients."2 Many lawyers and courts no longer look to religious
principles for guidance in their professional duties.3 "Instead,
the bar now looks primarily to the adversary system, rather than
broad moral principles, as the source of what is right."4 The law-
yer does have duties to the client, the court, and the common
good, but the deification of these duties has led to "suspension of
moral assessment of [the client's] objectives, and perhaps also of
the means chosen to secure them (at least if the client insists on
those means)."'
* B.A., 1997, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate, 2000, Notre
Dame Law School; 1998-2000 ThomasJ. White Scholar. I am eternally indebted
to my parents, Rob and Libet Kuehn, and to my fianc&e, Michelle Tito, for their
undying love and support.
1. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9
(1975).
2. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND.
L. REv. 717, 719 (1988) (quoting Mark D. Howe, Book Review, 60 HARV. L. REV.
838, 841 (1947) (reviewing 1 R. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FiRM AND ITS PREDECES-
soRs, 1819-1947 (1946))). See also ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 1-2 (1924)
(change has occurred in the source of obligation of legal precepts).
3. See generally JOHN PAUL II, THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH: VERITATIS SPLEN-
DOR para. 106 (Vatican trans., 1993) [hereinafter SPLENDOR OF TRUTH].
4. Gordon J. Beggs, Proverbial Practice: Legal Ethics From Old Testament Wis-
dom, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 831, 833 (1995).
5. Gerald J. Postema, Self-Image, Integrity, and Professional Responsibility, in
THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYRS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 286, 288 (David
Luban ed., 1983); see also At.AN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PRO-
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However, not all lawyers are willing to wash their hands of
moral responsibility when making professional judgments.6 The
lawyer who strives both to adhere to her religion's moral teach-
ing and to have a successful legal practice will attempt to lead
what Professor Deborah Rhode calls a "more ethically reflective
form of legal practice"; such a practice will "require different ide-
ological foundations. Lawyers must assume personal moral
responsibility for the consequences of their professional
actions."7 Those lawyers who strive to base their professional
decisions on the moral principles of their faith are the intended
audience of this note.
The "morality" which I will discuss is based both on analyses
by legal scholars and on the teachings of the Roman Catholic
Church. Although for Catholics moral authority derives from
the Church's teaching of revealed truths rooted in the natural
law, many Catholics find intellectual discourse about those teach-
ings helpful in putting their faith into practice. Likewise, non-
Catholic Christians, recognizing their belief in the moral impera-
tives of the natural law, may look to Catholic revelation of the
natural law as it is intended to be-that is, "universal"-for gui-
dance in moral matters.' I intend for this note to be instructive
for all lawyers who either choose to follow Christian beliefs or
find persuasive the views and arguments herein presented.
One situation in which both the lawyer's and client's moral
responsibilities are implicated has been largely unexamined:
FESSIONAL ETHICS 90 (1980) (arguing that a lawyer should not impose own
moral opinion of client's legal objectives).
Professor David Luban refers to the disregard of moral principles in profes-
sional decision-making as the "standard conception of the lawyer's role." David
Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A
Reply to Stephen Eliman, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1004, 1004 (1990). He offers the
sentiments of Elihu Root on the attitude of "hardball" attorneys: "'The client
never wants to be told he can't do what he wants to do; he wants to be told how
to do it, and it is the lawyer's business to tell him how.'" Id.
6. See Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Eth-
ics, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1253, 1257 (1998).
7. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REv.
589, 643 (1985); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, On Religious Legal Ethics, 35 CATH.
LAw. 393, 397 (1994) (arguing that lawyers must turn to religion for moral gui-
dance in professional decisions).
8. Professor Luban notes C.S. Lewis's collection of precepts from various
sources-Jewish, Christian, Hindu, Babylonian, Old Norse, Egyptian, Chinese,
Greek, and Roman-which illustrates the universality of the natural law. See
Luban, supra note 5, at 1024 n.70. Luban recognizes that counterarguments
abound, but he notes: "[I]t seems to me that Lewis has a point: does any cul-
ture deny that gratuitous cruelty is evil or that children deserve special care and
indulgence?" Id.
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whether it is immoral for a lawyer to advise a client to offer
"legally true" but nonetheless intentionally misleading state-
ments under oath. The infrequent discussion of this issue likely
is due in part to the legality of the morally questionable conduct.
In Bronston v. United States,9 the Supreme Court held that a wit-
ness does not commit perjury when he or she responds to an
opponent's question with a legally true but misleading answer.
The Court reversed Bronston's perjury conviction that was based
on testimony he gave regarding Swiss bank accounts belonging
to him and his company.' ° Although the statement was mislead-
ing in the context of the prosecution's line of questioning, it was
truthful when considered by itself. I write this article because I
believe that more than legal precedent is necessary to justify a
morally questionable course of conduct.
The reader will best understand the problem if she keeps a
hypothetical situation in mind.11 In the hypothetical, a witness is
in court answering under oath questions posed by the oppo-
nent's lawyer. A direct answer to one question which the lawyer
poses would incriminate the witness. Instead of answering the
question directly, the witness makes a statement which, if consid-
ered out of context, is true. When placed in the context of the
questioning, however, the statement clearly is misleading. The
witness's attorney is implicated because she anticipated the oppo-
nent's question, referred her client to it, and instructed the cli-
ent how to provide the misleading answer.
Meaningful analysis of the attorney's moral dilemma
requires that two questions be answered. First, is the lawyer mor-
ally responsible for choices a client makes based on her advice?
If the attorney is not morally accountable, then she may disre-
gard moral implications that her advice might have. Second, if
one decides that the lawyer can be morally responsible, one must
ask whether the client acts immorally when he chooses to give a
9. 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
10. Bronston's testimony was as follows:
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have you ever?
A: The company had an account there for about six months in
Zurich.
Id. at 354 (emphasis added). It was proven that Bronston had his own Swiss
bank account for a period of almost five years, and the prosecution argued that
his response was intentionally misleading and therefore was perjurious. See id.
at 345-55.
11. The hypothetical is based on the facts of Bronston.
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legally true but misleading statement. 12 If the client does not act
immorally, then the lawyer commits no moral wrong when she
advises the client to make a misleading statement. If the lawyer is
morally accountable for her client's actions, and if the client's
action is immoral, then the attorney can be morally culpable for
advising her client to make the misleading statement.
In this note, I argue that lawyers within the adversary litiga-
tion system can be morally accountable for advising a client to
make legally true but misleading statements under oath.'" I ana-
lyze this in the context of the two aforementioned questions.
First, I present three common views under which the lawyer is
not responsible for the client's actions. Next, I respond to those
views with analyses of legal scholars and the teachings of the
Catholic Church. Because I conclude that the lawyer is morally
responsible for her professional actions, I proceed to discuss
whether the client's act is immoral. Finally, after concluding that
the client's act is immoral and therefore the lawyer's advice can
be immoral, I present possible courses of conduct for lawyers
who are "influenced by their religious/moral commitments, not
just the moral guidelines set out by their profession."14
I. OPPOSING VIEWPOINT: A LAWYER IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR
A CLIENT'S ACTIONS
A commonly held view of contemporary attorneys is that a
lawyer is not morally responsible for advice given to a client upon
which the client acts. Support for this view can be derived from
many different sources of which I will present three: legal posi-
tivism, skepticism, and the concept of role morality.
A. Legal Positivism
A positivist view of legal ethics supports the position that a
lawyer is not morally accountable for her client's actions. I use
the term "positivism" in the same sense as Professor William H.
Simon, namely "the kind of theory which emphasizes the separa-
12. I presume that the client makes his statement under oath in court, at
a deposition, or in an interrogatory, that the client knows that his statement is
misleading, and that the client exercises complete freedom in making the state-
ment (that the client is not under social or psychological duress).
13. Professor Stephen Gillers poses the question, albeit in "ethical" rather
than "moral" terms: "If [the] lawyer had coached [the client] to give literally
truthful but evasive and misleading answers (but not untruthful ones), would
the lawyer have acted unethically even if [the client] would not thereby have
committed perjury?" STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF
LAw AND ETHICS 354 (3d ed. 1992).
14. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1255.
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tion of law from personal and social norms .... "15 A positivist
society is comprised of individuals that are wholly concerned with
themselves. Professor Harold J. Berman writes that positivism,
"which in the twentieth century has come to dominate American
and European legal thought, identifies law with the policies of
the lawmaker ...expressed in the form of a more or less self-
contained body of rules laid down by the state and enforced by
state sanctions."" A lawyer serves to explain how the client will
be affected by the government, that is, by the artificial system
constructed to maintain order.1 7
In this system, according to Simon, "the lawyer's neutrality is
essential to the proper performance of [her] basic task" of pre-
dicting how the sovereign will affect the client.18 "Since the legal
system is independent of personal ends and social norms, the lawyer's
ends and his notions of social norms have no relevance to the
prediction of the sovereign's actions."19 By taking her ends into
account-and "personal" ends are understood to be "moral"
ends in this context-the lawyer would become less effective in
her predictions.2" If the lawyer is not permitted to consider her
moral convictions in deciding how to advise clients, then the law-
yer cannot be held accountable if adhering to legal standards
causes her to violate those moral convictions.
B. Skepticism: The Epistemological Excuse
The skeptic, like the positivist, would not hold a lawyer mor-
ally accountable for a client's actions. Professor David Luban
explicates the skeptic's view: "Because lawyers are forbidden
from lying or knowingly putting on perjured testimony, knowing
too much can tie a lawyer's hands."'" Luban offers the reflections of
a white-collar defense lawyer to illustrate the importance to many
attorneys of remaining ignorant of certain aspects of the client's
case: "I can remember years ago when I represented a fellow in a
15. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: ProceduralJustice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 30, 39.
16. HaroldJ. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 143, 151 (1994).
17. See Simon, supra note 15, at 40-41.
18. Id. at 41.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. See id.
21. David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 958 (1999)
(emphasis added). Professor Luban discusses varying degrees of deliberate
ignorance. See id. at 967-75. One extreme is represented by the Ostrich; she
"sticks her head in the sand" to avoid learning what she does not want to learn.
Id. at 959. The other extreme is illustrated by the Fox; he is a "premeditating
crook, a grand schemer whose only reason for guarding himself from knowl-
edge is to prepare a defense of ignorance." Id. at 958.
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massive case of political corruption. I was very young, and I
asked him, 'Would you please tell me everything that happened.'
And he said, 'What, are you out of your mind?'"22 Were a lawyer
to know "everything that happened," she would be unable to
make those arguments which, though more persuasive and likely
to prevail, would be untrue in light of the client's circumstances.
Luban offers another example of skepticism. During World
War II, Albert Speer was Hitler's architect and minister of arma-
ments. When advised by his friend, Karl Hanke, that he should
never accept an invitation to inspect certain concentration
camps, Speer reflected:
[Hanke] had seen something there which he was not per-
mitted to describe and moreover could not describe. I did
not query him, I did not query Himmler, I did not query
Hitler, I did not speak with personal friends. I did not
investigate-for I did not want to know what was happening
there. Hanke must have been speaking of Auschwitz ....
[F]rom fear of discovering something which might have
made me turn from my course, I had closed my eyes.23
Speer was the only defendant at the Nuremberg Trials who took
responsibility for his crimes.2 4 He claimed he had no knowledge
of the Final Solution. However, he confessed that he could have
known but instead chose to remain ignorant in order to keep a
clear conscience.25
The skepticist view also is illustrated by Professor Monroe H.
Freedman in the context of another moral dilemma, namely the
problem of pleading a client "not guilty" whom the lawyer
believes to be guilty. Freedman explains that there "is, of course,
a simple way to evade the dilemma raised by the not guilty plea.
Some attorneys rationalize the problem by insisting that a lawyer
never knows for sure whether his client is guilty."2 6 Freedman
notes several reasons why the client might indeed be innocent
despite an admission of guilt: the client might be protecting a
friend or family member, or the client might have thought he
22. Id. at 957-58 (citation omitted).
23. ALBERT SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 375-76 (1970) (emphasis
added).
24. See Luban, supra note 21, at 965.
25. See id.
26. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1472 (1966); see also
Rhode, supra note 7, at 617 ("Arguments from skepticism fall into a variety of
camps but share a common premise and pedigree. In essence, the premise is
that lawyers neither can nor ought to make the factual and normative judg-
ments that more rigorous ethical obligations would entail.").
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committed the crime, but circumstances unknown to him would
prove he did not.27 Freedman suggests that skepticism as to facts
"can also be taken as a response at a level of personal morality,
specifically, as a rejection of personal moral responsibility."28
Professor Freedman discusses a "more honest and more use-
ful" understanding of the skepticist view, that is, "by viewing the
propositions in systemic rather than personal terms. "29 Accord-
ing to this understanding, the attorney cannot "know" whether a
client's assertions are true because of the nature of the adversary
system. The procedures established in the system require that
the judgment of truth be made after the facts and relevant law
have been presented to a judge or jury. In personal terms, the
lawyer may know the truth. Her personal knowledge, however, is
irrelevant in systemic terms because she has no role in determin-
ing the only "truth" important to the system.30 The attorney can-
not be accountable if she either does not know whether the
client's response is truthful or if her knowledge is irrelevant to
the determination. "Invoking [the incapacity to determine truth-
fulness], lawyers have resisted both legal and moral accountabil-
ity for their participation in conduct later found to be
fraudulent, misleading, hazardous, or unconscionable." 13 ' For
the skeptic, the lawyer is not morally accountable and the inquiry
therefore need not continue.
C. Role (Separate) Morality
Whereas the skeptic claims not to know, either systemically
or personally, the true facts of the client's case, an adherent of
"role morality" is comfortable with knowing the facts of the case
and assumes definite moral responsibility. However, the role
moralist shifts the source of values from an objective moral order
to the legal system. In her role as a lawyer in an adversarial sys-
tem, the lawyer acts with a separate morality-one justified by the
system itself. The system, in turn, requires the lawyer to "pursue
a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer," that is, to do what the
client requests if it is legal and ethical.3 2 In Professor Freed-
27. See FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 52-54; Freedman, supra note 26, at
1472.
28. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 53 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 53.
30. See id.
31. Rhode, supra note 7, at 618.
32. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1998). An
"ethical" action, in this context, is one which is consistent with the applicable
code of professional responsibility; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Eth-
2000]
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man's words, "once the lawyer has assumed responsibility to rep-
resent a client, the zealousness of that representation cannot be
tempered by the lawyer's moral judgments of the client or of the
client's cause."3
3
Professor Freedman staunchly advocates this view. He
argues that if a client desires to pursue a legal right which the
lawyer believes is immoral, the lawyer must defer to the client's
desired course of action notwithstanding the lawyer's moral
objection.34 Professor Freedman cites several policy concerns
which support role morality: maintaining the adversary system;
presumption of client innocence and the burden of reasonable
doubt; the right to counsel; and the confidentiality that is an
integral part of the lawyer-client relationship.35
Professor Thomas L. Shaffer asserts that a separate profes-
sional morality has been prevalent in American legal ethics since
the late nineteenth century. He discusses the doctrine in terms
of "kingdoms." "Two Kingdom" reasoning emerges from the
argument that "each office has a moral logic of its own, an inher-
ent morality that is defined, not by the person's status or order,
but by the nature of the work he is given to do."3 6 Shaffer cites
Albert Speer as an example of the Two Kingdom approach.
Speer "told himself he need not worry about Hitler's slave-labor
camps because his job was to be an architect, and the logic of
that job required single-minded devotion to the design of great
buildings." 7
ics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45,
53 (1991) ("Lawyers' paramount duties are to their clients: attorneys must pur-
sue client interests zealously, remain loyal at all times, and maintain client
secrets.").
33. Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27
CATH. U. L. REv. 191, 199 (1978). Freedman takes a position diametrically
opposed to that which I advocate in this paper: "In day to day law practice, the
most common instances of amoral or immoral conduct by lawyers are those
occasions in which we preempt our clients' moral judgments." Id. at 200.
34. See Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH.
U. L. REv. 331, 335 (1986).
35. See Freedman, supra note 26, at 1482. Two additional policy reasons
have been suggested by Alan H. Goldman. First, the client pays the lawyer to
guide the client through legal matters. By placing equal importance on his own
moral considerations and his client's interests, the lawyer ignores the fact that
the client pays him to do otherwise. Second, by imposing her moral judgment
on a client, the lawyer disadvantages the client (who holds different moral val-
ues) with respect to the dominant views of the legal profession. See GOLDMAN,
supra note 5, at 108.
36. THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND
DISCUSSION Topics 191 (1985).
37. Id.
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Professor Murray L. Schwartz advocates role morality in
slightly different terms. In the lawyer's role as operator of the
adversary system, "lawyers must meet certain expectations about
their behavior. '3 8 His theory is based on two principles which he
derives from codes of professional responsibility that govern law-
yer conduct: the Principle of Professionalism, and its corollary,
the Principle of Nonaccountability.
According to the Principle of Professionalism, "[w] hen act-
ing as an advocate, a lawyer must, within the established con-
straints upon professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that
the client will prevail." 9 The lawyer is required to place unassail-
able importance on the client's interests. Accordingly, the lawyer
is only constrained by the system's rules governing professional
behavior.4 0 By definition, this principle forbids the lawyer to rely
on moral principles in making client-centered decisions.
From this follows an inescapable conclusion: because the
lawyer is not permitted to follow moral guidelines, she cannot be
held morally responsible for professional decisions. Schwartz
embodies this conclusion in the Principle of Nonaccountability:
"When acting as an advocate for a client according to the Princi-
ple of Professionalism, a lawyer is neither legally, professionally,
nor morally accountable for the means used or the ends
achieved."4 1  Schwartz clarifies the reach of the principle by
assuring that the lawyer is protected from more than civil and
criminal liability or professional criticism and sanctions. "IT]he
Principle of Nonaccountability for the Advocate proposed here
goes further in asserting that the same demands of the system
also justify the moral nonaccountability of the advocate."4 2 The
result of Schwartz's two principles is a complete disregard for
moral responsibility, and an "adversarial lawyer is driven to select
facts, present proofs and make arguments by the force of his cli-
ent's interests, and in some quarters is viewed as morally bound
to advance those interests under a 'means justifies the end'
rationale."4 3
The following two examples illustrate the manifestation of
role morality in the legal profession. Professor (now Circuit
38. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REv. 669, 672 (1978).
39. Id. at 673.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Prozek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Admin-
istrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Law-
yer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 317-18 (1997).
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Judge) John T. Noonan, Jr., offers one example of role morality
in legal history. He cites the actions of Hoyt Moore, a New York
lawyer who represented Bethlehem Steel in a foreclosure action
on one of Bethlehem's small debtors, Williamsport Wire Rope.
In order to facilitate a smooth foreclosure, Moore bribed the
judge in the case by paying approximately $600,000 in fees to
some of the judge's nominees. The state indicted Moore but
could not convict him because the statute of limitations already
had run. Noonan observes that Moore had no reason-financial
or otherwise-to use such extreme measures except that he did
what his client wanted. "In a sense, there was no division between
Moore's morals and his client's morals-his client's morals had
become his, and if they had to 'play ball' with a corrupt federal
judge, Moore was willing to arrange it."44 That Moore "remained
a pillar of his firm and of the New York bar" exemplifies the legal
profession's ratification of a separate morality for the role of
attorneys.45
Professor Luban offers an illustration of role morality's
effects on the legal practice. In order to fight a hostile takeover
of Conoco by Seagram's, Conoco's chief legal advisor, Joseph
Flom, suggested that Conoco inform its Arab suppliers that Sea-
gram's was under Jewish ownership. Flom reasoned that, if the
Arab suppliers were opposed to Jewish management, Conoco's
board likely would not risk the change in ownership:
The plan was carried out successfully. Here ... the lawyer
has created a potential international incident, fomented
and utilized antisemitism, and-perhaps-obstructed a
legitimate and worthwhile market transaction. Yet here
too the standard conception of the lawyer's role seems to
preclude any moral criticism of the tactic.46
D. Summary
Positivism, skepticism, and role morality each share a com-
mon outcome with regard to the current discussion: the lawyer is
not responsible for advice given to a client upon which the client
acts. If the lawyer is not accountable, any discussion of client
morality would be superfluous.
44. John T. Noonan, Jr., Distinguished Alumni Lecture-Other People's
Morals: The Lawyer's Conscience, 48 TENN. L. REV. 227, 230 (1981).
45. Id. at 229.
46. Luban, supra note 5, at 1018.
LEGALLY TRUE BUT MISLEADING STATEMENTS
II. SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS: A LAWYER Is RESPONSIBLE FOR
A CLIENT'S ACTIONS
The lawyer who strives to incorporate her morality into her
legal practice cannot be satisfied with the three approaches dis-
cussed above. Professor Leslie Griffin states the position well: "If
the believer assesses her professional life in light of her religious
commitments, then she will have a dual task. Not only will she
have to master the profession's ethical standards, but she will also
have to weigh these norms against the second standard of the
religious commitment."47 The lawyer would recognize that she
cannot divide herself as a moral agent. "In morals . . . only a
person acts, always a person, always and only a single and whole
person."48 Professor Luban refers to lawyers who consider them-
selves morally responsible for their professional decisions as
"morally activist" lawyers. He cites for the guiding principle of
the morally activist lawyer a memorandum which Justice Brandeis
wrote to himself while he still was a practicing attorney: "Advise
client what he should have-not what he wants."49
For guidance, lawyers can look to legal and theological dis-
course as well as Christian teachings, especially those of the Cath-
olic Church. As Pope John Paul II stated: "Only God can answer
the question about the good, because he is the Good."5 Two
indispensable underlying themes in Christian morality are love of
God and love of neighbor. These are the basis of the Decalogue and
are essential commandments for those who wish to attain eternal
life.5 "Both the Old and the New Testaments explicitly affirm
that without love of neighbor, made concrete in keeping the com-
mandments, genuine love for God is not possible." 2 Pope John Paul
II cites St. John for this proposition: "If anyone says, 'I love God,'
47. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1258; see also Noonan, supra note 44, at 240
(arguing that lawyers need theological perspective when making professional
decisions).
48. SHAFFER, supra note 35, at 192. Professor Shaffer cites St. Augustine
for the proposition that to attempt to separate one's moral obligations into
personal and professional spheres is destructive. " 'My two wills ... were in con-
flict and in their conflict wasted my soul.'" Id. at 193 (citation omitted).
49. Luban, supra note 5, at 1004.
50. SPLENDOR OF TRUTH, supra note 3, at para. 12.
51. See id. at para. 14. "By his reason, man recognizes the voice of God
which urges him 'to do what is good and avoid what is evil.' Everyone is obliged
to follow this law, which . . . is fulfilled in the love of God and of neighbor."
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 1706 (United States Catholic Con-
ference, Inc. trans., 1994) [hereinafter CATECHISM]. "Justice is the moral virtue
that consists in the constant and firm will to give their due to God and neigh-
bor." Id. at para. 1807.
52. SPLENDOR OF TRUTH, supra note 3, at para. 14.
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and hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his
brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not
seen."53 The following responses to positivism, skepticism, and
role morality are based both on discourse consistent with the
Christian moral view and on the teachings of the Catholic
Church.
A. Response to Positivism
A Christian lawyer cannot accept positivist legal ethics. He
"rejects this position; he knows that law is not merely a means by
which the powerful impose their wills upon the remainder of the
community. He insists that criticism of rules of law is not merely
expression of subjective preference."54 The lawyer's course of
conduct is no longer dictated entirely by the client. "He denies
that his professional work is only a means of earning a living by
promoting the interests of the clients who pay his fees. 5
5
Positivist legal ethics results in morally unacceptable conse-
quences. For example, because a positivist legal system operates
independently of personal moral ends and social norms, some
morally justified and desirable conduct might be considered
impermissible. The system thereby punishes disobedience of
positivist norms that, in moral terms, is necessary.56 The "legal
and personal moral failure" of the system prevailed "among
Northern anti-slavery judges prior to the Civil War when they
consistently reached unnecessarily doctrinaire decisions support-
ing slavery despite their deep moral or political repugnance
toward slavery."57 Such decisions were the result of a "stern judi-
cial positivism which viewed law and morality as analytically dis-
tinct, and which required formalistic decision-making to preserve
this distinction. "58
The Christian response to positivism is premised on the
commandments to love God and one's neighbor. Whereas a pos-
itivist focuses solely on the individual, the command to love one's
neighbor requires that human beings live in community and take
others into account when making decisions. "The human person
needs to live in society. Society is not for him an extraneous
addition but a requirement of his nature. Through the
53. Id. (quoting 1 John 4:20).
54. Wilber G. Katz, Law, Christianity and the University, 10 VAND. L. REv.
879, 880 (1957).
55. Id.
56. See Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurispru-
dence in Legal Ethics, 80 IowA L. REv. 901, 901 (1995).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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exchange with others, mutual service and dialogue with his
brethren, man develops his potential; he thus responds to his
vocation."5 Pope John XXIII taught that the benefits of a soci-
ety concerned with the spiritual "'give aim and scope to all that
has bearing on . . . social institutions, political movements and
form, laws, and all other structures by which society is outwardly
established and constantly developed."' 60
A fundamental Catholic teaching (also accepted in many
other religions) is that the believer is required to follow an estab-
lished objective morality. "Catholic morality presumes there are
objective norms of conduct. Certain actions are good and others
bad... always and everywhere and for everyone who knows what
he is doing and does so with sufficient reflection and freedom of
assent."6 John A. Hardon, S.J., accurately indicates that the
"Church has had to defend this moral objectivity in modern
times, whenever subjectivism threatened the foundations of
Catholic morality."62 Professor Berman echoes this sentiment,
stating that the natural-law theory which, before the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, prevailed in the West, "has fought a
rear-guard battle against positivism ever since .... "63
Objective morality is known by reason; it is the natural moral
law that guides a person to choose to do good and avoid evil.
"The natural law, present in the heart of each man and estab-
lished by reason, is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to
all men."6 4 Indeed, "[e]veryone is obliged to follow this law,
which makes itself heard in conscience and is fulfilled in the love
of God and neighbor."65 Pope John Paul II informs the faithful that
God has determined what is good by inscribing in the hearts of
human beings the natural law. He offers the image propounded
by St. Thomas Aquinas and affirmed in the Catechism of the
Catholic Church that the natural law is the "light of understand-
59. CATEcHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1879.
60. Id. at 1886 (quoting JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS para. 36 (1963))
(emphasis added); see also JOHN PAUL II, FIDES ET RATIO para. 32 (1998)
("[Blelief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an
interpersonal relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to
know but also the deeper capacity to entrust oneself to others, to enter into a
relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.").
61. JOHN A. HlaRDON, S.J., THE CATHOLIC CATECHiSM 293 (1975).
62. Id.
63. Berman, supra note 16, at 151.
64. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1956 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at para. 1706 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also id. at
para. 1713 ("Man is obliged to follow the moral law, which urges him 'to do
what is good and avoid what is evil.'").
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ing infused in us by God, whereby we understand what must be
done and what must be avoided."66
The obligations to live in community with others and to
adhere to the natural moral law eliminate positivism as a feasible
model of legal ethics. From these requirements it follows that a
person cannot base decisions solely on individualistic
motivations:
The right to religious liberty can of itself be neither unlim-
ited nor limited only by a 'public order' conceived in a posi-
tivist or naturalist manner .... [The limits of religious
-liberty must be determined] in accordance with "legal
principles which are in conformity with the objective moral
ord"r.
"
67
Professor Simon is correct in his assertion that a natural law law-
yer "believes that a legal system must meet certain normative pre-
conditions to be entitled to respect and compliance, and perhaps
even to be considered a system of law."6" If the laws of the system
conflict with moral imperatives, then the lawyer must adhere to
her moral norms in lieu of complying with the law.69
B. Response to Skepticism
Like the positivist, the skeptic cannot maintain his view in
light of rational and religious criticism. An initial noteworthy
consideration is that the legal system fosters pragmatism in most
situations. Professor Luban recognizes that lawyers who normally
are pragmatic in their decision-making processes "and who usu-
ally have no patience for philosophical abstractions and para-
doxes, suddenly embrace a wildly implausible standard of
knowledge as Cartesian certainty-roughly, equating knowledge
with infallibility-whenever 'knowing' something would prove
inconvenient."7 Within a coherent system of objective morality,
66. SPLENDOR OF TRUTH, supra note 3, at para. 12; see also CATECHISM,
supra note 51, at para. 1951. Professor Berman clarifies:
Natural law theory does not deny the virtues of political order but it
would subordinate them to standards ofjustice .... Its advocates put
reason over will, and conscience over power; they would stress as the
principal source of law not legislation but equity, the sense of fairness;
they would subordinate rules to the purposes which they embody.
Berman, supra note 16, at 151.
67. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 2109 (emphasis added).
68. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1083, 1115 (1988); see also Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear
Terrorism, 24 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 1 n.9 (1994).
69. For an exposition of this idea, see infra Pt. IV.
70. David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective,
63 GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 955, 980 (1995).
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however, convenience does not justify behavior that otherwise
conflicts with an established moral precept.
Professor Deborah Rhode asserts that skepticism is inade-
quate on its own terms. In order to be plausible, skepticism
would require an unattainable and inappropriate standard of
certainty. "No system of governance could function if certitude
became a requisite for liability. Since the law generally does not
insist on omniscience, why should professional ideology require
more?"7 1 Rhode concludes that, in many situations, lawyers
should know the factual elements of a client's case. Even if they
do not, Rhode believes that lawyers should not be relieved of all
responsibility for the advice they give.72
According to the Church's epistemology, a person can
"know" things and therefore need not dwell in a realm of uncer-
tainty. With regard to following his conscience, a person "is
obliged to follow faithfully what he knows to be just and right." 3
The conscience is guided by the natural moral law. Through the
conscience, "[t] he natural law expresses the original moral sense
which enables man to discern by reason the good and the evil, the
truth and the lie."7 4 Because the lawyer can know whether the cli-
ent is being truthful, the lawyer cannot turn to skepticism as a
convenient way to avoid responsibility for advising a client to
make misleading statements.
C. Response to Role Morality
Separate role morality is rejected by those lawyers who want
to practice according to a "one kingdom" approach.7 5 "These
dissidents say they believe and try to live as if there is only one
kingdom and as if there can only be one morality in our lives, a
single morality to govern both personal life and professional
life."7 6 Professor Leslie Griffin notes that "[f]rom Jewish and
Christian authors emerge strong warnings against the separate
role morality espoused by the legal profession."7 7 Such warnings,
if expressed through reason founded properly in objective
morality, undermine the basic tenets of role morality.
Catholic teaching precludes a lawyer's reliance on her role
in the adversary system for moral justification in several ways.
71. Rhode, supra note 7, at 619.
72. See id.
73. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1778 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at para. 1954 (emphasis added).
75. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
76. SHAFFER, supra note 35, at 208.
77. Leslie Griffin, The Lawyer's Dirty Hands, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 219,
220 (1995).
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First, Professor Schwartz himself suggests that his Principle of
Nonaccountability, "which relieves the advocate of moral
accountability[,] is open to objection."78 He admits that if one
were to accept the argument that law cannot make an immoral
act moral, "the justification for the application of the Principle of
Non-accountability to moral accountability would disappear." 79
The Church teaches that decisions must be based on objective
moral principles whose source is the natural law. Because the
natural law flows from the divine and eternal laws, and because
human law cannot be exalted over the law of God, human laws
cannot trump the divine, eternal, or natural laws and make an
immoral act a moral one. °
Second, ChiefJudge Clement F. Haynsworth of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit echoed Catholic doctrine when
he stated that the lawyer "serves to further the lawful and proper
objective of the client, but the lawyer must never forget that he is
the master. He is not there to do the client's bidding. It is for
the lawyer to decide what is morally and legally right .... "1 This
idea is fundamental to Alan Goldman's belief that lawyers are not
relieved of personal moral accountability for legal decisions.
Goldman argues that the lawyer's own moral autonomy is at stake
when she advises a client. "If [the lawyer] must do whatever the
client demands or desires in continuing to represent him, then
the lawyer is relinquishing all moral control over his own actions
to the client." 2 Goldman concludes that the value of client
78. Schwartz, supra note 38, at 674.
79. Id.
80. See CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1952 (finding that eternal law,
natural law, revealed law, and human laws are all interrelated expressions of the
moral law); see also id. at para. 1958 (natural law is immutable; "Even when it is
rejected in its very principles, it cannot be destroyed or removed from the heart
of man."); id. at para. 1959 ("The natural law, the Creator's very good work,
provides the solid foundation on which man can build the structure of moral
rules to guide his choices.").
81. Freedman, supra note 33, at 193 (quoting Clement F. Haynsworth,Jr.,
Professionalism in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L.Q. 627, 628 (1976)); see also Thomas L.
Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 319, 319 (1987):
Legal ethics is thinking about the morals of someone else. It is con-
cern with the goodness of someone else .... Legal ethics is compli-
cated by the fact that the discussion of this other person's morals is
focused not in his conscience but in mine. Legal ethics is thinking
about my client's morals, but I am the one who is thinking.
82. GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 129; see generally Luban, supra note 5, at
1012-14 (lawyer's reflections on the representation of a developer by another
lawyer who, it seems, "forgot he was a lawyer .... Mightjust as well been [sic]
the developer himself.").
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autonomy is insufficient to relieve lawyers of their moral
responsibility.
Haynsworth's and Goldman's views are supported by Catho-
lic doctrine that the Church's Catechism iterates clearly:
Freedom is exercised in relationships between human
beings. Every human person, created in the image of God,
has the natural right to be recognized as a free and respon-
sible being. All owe to each other this duty of respect. The
right to the exercise of freedom, especially in moral and reli-
gious matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity
of the human person.8
3
The Church stands firmly in its conviction that "[n]obody
may be forced to act against his convictions, nor is anyone to be
restrained from acting in accordance with his conscience in reli-
gious matters ... "84 The Church stands on this conviction in
accordance with the commandments to love God and one's
neighbor.8 5
Catholic teaching expressly holds that, in certain circum-
stances, one is responsible for others' sins when one cooperates in
them. 6 Those circumstances which are relevant to this analysis
are: "by participating directly and voluntarily in them" and "by
ordering, advising, praising, or approving them."' 7 By suggesting
a client give legally true but misleading statements, the lawyer
advises the client and thereby participates directly and voluntarily
in the client's action. 8 An essential and more complex issue,
however, is exactly how the lawyer "cooperates" in the client's
wrongdoing.
Referring to the current hypothetical, a lawyer can cooper-
ate with his client in two ways. "It is of great importance to distin-
guish between formal cooperation in another's sin and material
cooperation. The former is always sinful, the latter not always
83. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1738.
84. Id. at para. 2106.
85. SeeJOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE: EVANGELIUM VITAE para. 19
(Vatican trans., 1995) [hereinafter GOSPEL OF LIFE]:
Yes, every man is his "brother's keeper," because God entrusts us to
one another. And it is also in view of this entrusting that God gives
everyone freedom, a freedom which possesses an inherently relational
dimension .... [W] hen freedom is made absolute in an individualistic
way, it is emptied of its original content, and its very meaning and
dignity are contradicted.
86. See CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1868.
87. Id. at para. 1868 (emphasis added).
88. Whether the client's action is immoral will be discussed in the next
section. In order to determine whether the lawyer is responsible for a client's
action, the client's moral culpability is assumed.
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so." 9 First, the lawyer can cooperate formally by intending the
evil which she facilitates. She acts immorally anytime she cooper-
ates formally. Pope John Paul II writes: "Christians, like all peo-
ple of good will, are called upon under grave obligation of
conscience not to cooperate formally in practices which, even if
permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God's law."9  By
intending that the client's legally true statement mislead the
opposing party, the lawyer formally cooperates in the client's
deception and therefore is morally accountable.
A lawyer also can cooperate materially, that is, she helps the
client mislead the other party "by an act that is not sinful, and
without approving of what [the client] does."91 Material cooper-
ation can be either immediate or mediate. Immediate cooperation
requires that the lawyer actually assist in the immoral act; in the
current hypothetical, this is not possible because the client makes
the misleading statement of his own volition. The lawyer cooper-
ates mediately if her role is "secondary and subservient to the
main act of another, as to supply a burglar with tools for his bur-
glary."92 This accurately describes the lawyer's conduct; through
her advice, the lawyer gives the client the "tools" he can use to
mislead the opposing party.
Mediate material cooperation is described as proximate if the
lawyer's advice is intimately connected with the client's state-
ment. The person who assists the burglar in handling his tools
during a burglary would cooperate proximately.93 Cooperation
also can be remote, in which case the lawyer's advice is not closely
connected with the client's misleading statement. The person
who gives the burglar his tools prior to the burglary cooperates
remotely.94 The lawyer would cooperate proximately if she
extensively coached the client before questioning to ensure that
his misleading response was given effectively. This assistance
would help the client "handle the tools" given to him by the law-
yer. The lawyer would cooperate remotely if she gave the client a
general instruction to offer only that information which the
opposing party specifically requested. Through this limited
advice, the lawyer gives the client the tools he needs to make the
89. HENRY DAVIS, S.J., MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 341 (4th ed. 1945)
(emphasis added).
90. GOSPEL OF LiFE, supra note 85, at para. 74 (emphasis added).
91. DAVIs, supra note 89, at 341; see also Bishop John Myers, Obligations of
Catholics and Rights of Unborn Children, 20 ORIGINs 65, 70 (1990).
92. DAVIs, supra note 89, at 341.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 342.
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misleading statement but does not help the client handle those
tools.
In determining the extent of the lawyer's moral culpability,
Henry Davis, S.J., instructs that material cooperation is generally
sinful. However, the lawyer will not act immorally for cooperat-
ing materially if she meets two conditions.95 First, the act by
which she cooperates itself cannot be sinful. The lawyer meets
this condition because the act of cooperation, namely advising the
client, is not an immoral act. Indeed, if it were, there would be a
distinct shortage of morally-conscious lawyers, psychologists, psy-
chiatrists, guidance counselors, and members of other profes-
sions to which providing advice is an inherent role.
Second, there must be a sufficient cause for permitting the
client to act immorally. According to Davis, "a more serious
excuse is required for immediate than for mediate cooperation,
as also for proximate than for remote."96 Davis lists several fac-
tors to consider when judging the sufficiency of the lawyer's
excuse: the spiritual character and needs of the client; the law-
yer's relationship to the client; the gravity of the client's offense;
the harm the client will perpetrate on the opposing party; the
likely harm to the public; the proximity of the cooperation; and
whether the cooperation is dispensable.97 Davis astutely asserts
that "[g]reat varieties of opinion, therefore, on any given case
except the most obvious, are inevitable, and there is no more
difficult question than this in the whole range of Moral
Theology.""8
D. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the inadequacies of
positivism, skepticism, and role morality as those views apply to
legal ethics. According to Catholic moral theology, a lawyer is
responsible for advice upon which her client acts if the lawyer
cooperates with the client in making immoral choices. If the law-
yer cooperates either formally or materially and immediately,
then the attorney is morally responsible for her client's immoral
acts. If the lawyer's cooperation is material and mediate, how-
ever, then she may not be morally accountable. The lawyer must
carefully determine the degree of proximity of her advice to the
client's action, and she must apply carefully to her specific case
the factors expounded above. By doing so, she will determine to
95. See id.
96. Id at 341.
97. See id. at 342.
98. Id.
2000]
608 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
the best of her human ability whether any material cooperation
she provides is morally justifiable.
III. THE CLIENT'S MORAL CULPABILITY
To decide whether she can be morally accountable, the law-
yer must make one final determination: whether the client acted
immorally on the lawyer's advice to make a legally true but mis-
leading statement under oath. The fundamental difficulty with
this determination is that the client's statement is not clearly
untruthful and therefore immoral. According to the Church,
"[t]he moral quality of our actions derives from three different
sources, each so closely connected with the other that unless all
three are simultaneously good, the action performed is morally
bad."99  The Church declares that an act's "moral quality"
depends on the object chosen, the intention of the actor, and
the circumstances surrounding the action.10
Of primary concern is the client's intention in making a
legally true but misleading statement. "The intention is a move-
ment of the will toward the end: it is concerned with the goal of
the activity. '"101 Although it seems that the client could justify a
legally true but misleading statement if his intention were noble
(for example, to stay out of prison so that he might support his
family), intention alone cannot make an intrinsically wrong act
morally right.0 2 If the object of the client's action is wrongful,
the good intention cannot relieve him of moral culpability.
One also must consider the circumstances surrounding the
client's misleading statement when determining his moral
accountability. "The circumstances, including the consequences,
are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to
increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human
acts .... They can also diminish or increase the agent's responsibil-
ity."103 The degree of the client's culpability is significant to the
99. HARDON, supra note 61, at 283-84.
100. See CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1750.
101. Id. at para. 1752; see also HARDON, supra note 61, at 284 (motive is of
great importance in Catholic morality; some actions may be either good or bad,
depending on the actor's motivation).
102. Indeed, the intention of the action most often functions to make an
otherwise moral act immoral. See CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1753
("[A]n added bad intention (such as vainglory) makes an act evil that, in and of
itself, can be good (such as almsgiving).").
103. Id. at para. 1754 (second emphasis added); see also id. at para. 1957
("Application of the natural law varies greatly; it can demand reflection that
takes account of various conditions of life according to places, times, and
circumstances.").
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lawyer's own moral accountability: the lawyer acts only as immor-
ally as the client when cooperating in the client's action. How-
ever, if the object of the action is "always gravely illicit," then
neither the attendant circumstances nor the client's intentions
will diminish the act's moral gravity.10 4
I discuss the object of the action last because it requires a
more detailed analysis. The object chosen is the good toward
which the actor directs the action. "We should note that the
object is not only the physical makeup of an action, like taking
what belongs to someone else, but taking it with (or without) his
permission. Only in the second case is there any question of
theft."' 5 In the problem of the legally true but misleading state-
ment, the object is a proposition which the author knows to be
misleading.
Not every misleading statement is immoral when uttered.
However, if the statement is a "lie," and therefore perjurious
when uttered under oath, then the statement is inherently
immoral. 106 "To lie," according to the Church, "is to speak or act
against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the
right to know the truth."' Misleading statements, including
those that are legally-false, may be justifiable if they do not meet
all elements of this definition."0 8 In the current hypothetical sit-
uation, however, the client's statement is a lie. He therefore acts
immorally, and the lawyer can be held morally accountable.
104. See id. at para. 1756.
105. HARDON, supra note 61, at 284.
106. See infra p. 614 for a discussion of the meaning of "perjury" used
here and in the discussion which follows.
107. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 2483. Evidence of Christianity's
condemnation of lying is plentiful. See Prov. 6:16-19, 12:22, 19:5, 19:28 (St.
Joseph); CATECHISM, supra note 51, at paras. 2464, 2468-69, 2476, 2482, 2484-86.
Consider briefly the definition of "lie" offered in Black's Law Dictionary: "A
falsehood uttered for the purpose of deception; an intentional statement of an
untruth designed to mislead another; anything which misleads or deceives .... "
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 922 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). If one were
considering the legally true but misleading statement from a legal rather than a
moral perspective, it would be noteworthy that this definition encompasses any-
thing which is intentionally misleading.
108. For example, the definition requires that the person to whom the
falsehood is spoken have a right to know the truth. In the classic example of a
Jewish family hiding from Nazi stormtroopers during World War II, the person
hiding them is morally permitted to speak a falsehood in order to protect the
family. The rationale is that the stormtroopers had no right to know the truth
because they were searching for the family for morally-unjustifiable reasons.
The question of duty to tell the truth will be discussed below. See infra notes
113-21 and accompanying text.
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In order for the legally true but misleading statement to be a
lie, the client first must speak or act against the truth. According
to the Supreme Court's opinion in Bronston, the client does not
speak untruthfully when he makes the misleading statement.
However, this opinion is inconsistent with legal principles in
other areas of the law. The principles underlying the interpreta-
tion of both legislation and contracts are instructive as analogies
when analyzing the truthfulness of the client's statement.
First, the client's misleading statement would be untrue if
analyzed by principles of legislative interpretation. Like the
legally-defined term in the hypothetical case, the law is a "legal
definition" of a regulation and its enforcement mechanisms.
Enacted legislation frequently does not, and often cannot,
express the precise intention of the lawmakers who drafted it.
When a court is charged with enforcing a statute which contains
unclear or ambiguous language, the court looks to the intent of
the legislative body that drafted the law that is embodied in the
legislative intent.' Likewise, the intention of the attorney who
is questioning the client should be considered when determining
the moral value of the client's response. If the client knew or
clearly should have known what the opposing lawyer was asking,
the morality of his action should be determined as if he
responded to a question containing the lawyer's intended
meaning.
In his argument against relying strictly on the plain mean-
ings of words to determine legal truth and validity in a contract
setting, Stanley Fish supports the idea that a misleading state-
ment is untruthful. "A sentence is never not in a context. We are
never not in a situation . . . . A sentence . . is never in the
abstract; it is always in a situation ... it always has the meaning
that has been conferred on it by the situation in which it is
uttered."'10 The client's legally true statement is only truthful
when considered in isolation from the discussion in which it was
made. If one accepts Fish's proposition, however, one must con-
sider the context in which the statement fits. Assuming, as in the
109. See Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158,
185 (1989) ("Ordinarily, we ascertain the meaning of a statutory provision by
looking to its text, and, if the statutory language is unclear, to its legislative history.")
(emphasis added); see alsoJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540 (1977)
(Court looked to legislative history in the face of an unclear pre-emption
statute).
110. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BAsic CONTRACT LAw 581-82
(6th ed. 1996) (quoting Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language,
Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying
and Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625 (1978)) (emphasis added).
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hypothetical, that the client made the statement during question-
ing by his adversary's attorney, then the statement must be inter-
preted in the context of the entire line of questioning. In context,
the client intends that the statement fail to communicate the
truth that the attorney seeks. Understood in context, the state-
ment is indeed untruthful.
From the standpoint of Catholic morality, the client does
speak against the truth. St. Thomas Aquinas, a medieval philoso-
pher highly regarded in the tradition of the Catholic Church's
natural law teaching, wrote that it is immoral to "employ guile or
fraud" when defending oneself, "because fraud and guile have the
force of a lie ... ."1" The Church condemns lying as a "profana-
tion of speech whereas the purpose of speech is to communicate
known truth to others."'1 2 The same rationale applies to a mis-
leading statement because it, too, is made contrary to the pur-
pose of speech. The client is asked to "communicate a known
truth" to the opponent's attorney, and the client fails to do so by
providing a misleading answer. By making the false statement,
the client employs "guile" in order to avoid communicating a
known truth. The misleading statement therefore is untruthful.
In order to be a "lie," the statement also must be uttered in
order to lead the questioner into error. "A lie consists in speak-
ing a falsehood with the intention of deceiving."' n If the client
did not intend to mislead, then his statement would not be a "lie"
and his act would not be immoral. Intent to lead into error is an
indispensable aspect of the client's statement in question. For
the purposes of this analysis, that intent is assumed.
In addition to being untruthful and intending to mislead,
the client must speak the statement to someone who has the
right to know the truth; that is, the client must have a moral duty
to tell the truth to the questioner. "The right to the communication
of the truth is not unconditional .... This requires us in con-
crete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal
the truth to someone who asks for it." '14 When the client who is
under oath is asked a question by opposing counsel, the client
has a duty to tell the truth precisely because he has sworn under
oath to tell the whole truth. To lie under oath is to violate the
Second Commandment which forbids taking the Lord's name in
vain. "Taking an oath or swearing is to take God as a witness to
111. 2 SUMMA THEOLOCICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 1491 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1947) [hereinafter AQUINAS] (emphasis
added).
112. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 2485.
113. Id. at para. 2482.
114. Id. at para. 2488.
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what one affirms. It is to invoke the divine truthfulness as a
pledge of one's own truthfulness."115 To offer the misleading
statement under oath is tantamount to committing perjury. "A
person commits perjury when he makes a promise under oath
with no intention of keeping it, or when after promising on oath
he does not keep it."'16
I must digress briefly to clarify my use of the word perjury in
this discussion. Clearly, "perjury" is a word with legal significance.
In Bronston, for example, the Court was concerned with client
perjury in a legal context. However, as the Bronston Court held, a
legally true but misleading statement is not legally perjurious. In
this discussion, I do not refer to "perjury" in this legal sense.
This note focuses on the morality of making misleading state-
ments under oath, not the legality of that act (which the Bronston
Court already has determined). The oath which binds the moral
actor to tell the "whole truth" is, in this context, a moral obliga-
tion which produces moral consequences. In this discussion, I
use "perjury" in a moral context consistent with the definition
expounded in the previous paragraph.
The client might argue that he meets one of the conditions
which may negate his duty: others' good and safety, respect for
his and his family's privacy, or the common good.117 According
to the Church's teaching, those conditions are "sufficient reasons
for being silent about what ought not be known orfor making use of
a discreet language."1 ' On its face, this language would appear to
justify the client's misleading statement. This, however, is not
the case.
The client must be free from his duty t tell the truth in
order to remain silent or use "discreet language." While the
aforementioned conditions will suffice to relieve him of that duty
in many situations, they do not relieve his duty when he has taken
an oath to tell the truth. "[W] hen a man lies in court in order to
exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to
obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the
truth."1 1 9 Thus, the same misleading statement made when the
client is not under oath is morally unacceptable when made
under oath in court, at a deposition, or in an interrogatory. The
115. Id. at para. 2150.
116. Id. at para. 2152.
117. See id. at para. 2489.
118. Id. at para. 2489 (emphasis added).
119. AQUINAS, supra note 111, at 1490. For Aquinas, the witness is bound
to tell the truth even if, by doing so, he risks capital punishment.
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duty which the client assumes by taking an oath makes his mis-
leading statement given under oath a lie.1 21
Because the client utters an untruthful statement, leads his
questioner into error, and has a duty to communicate the truth
when he takes an oath, he lies and therefore commits perjury
when he makes a legally true but misleading statement under
oath. In order for an action to be morally acceptable, however, it
"requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the cir-
cumstances together."1 2 1 In the client's case, the object vitiates
the act in its entirety because the object of his action-the lie-is
evil. 122 Because the client acts immorally in making a legally true
but misleading statement under oath, the lawyer can be morally
accountable for advising him to do so.
IV. THE LAWYER'S POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The lawyer who accepts the conclusion that she can be
accountable for cooperating in the client's immoral conduct will
find herself faced with the troublesome issue of a proper course
of conduct. "[T] he attorney-client relationship metamorphoses
into something very different from the hired gun model ....
[T] he lawyer must reconcile conflicts between her own consid-
ered moral judgments and the client's wishes."123 A lawyer
undoubtedly will encounter clients who do not respond amiably
when the lawyer offers moral objections to the client's legal
objectives. "The morally activist lawyer regrets this, but sees
'advise client what he should have-not what he wants' as the
minimum that legal ethics requires of her."' 24 The lawyer's reli-
gious beliefs and moral standards likely are at the root of the
controversy. Unfortunately, "[t]raditional legal ethics has not
promulgated standards for religious dissent.' 25
I substantially affirm Professor Luban's view that the
approach to morally-activist client counseling should focus on
the moral implications of the client's objectives and should be
discussed "'in the same matter-of-fact and (one hopes) unmoral-
istic manner that one discusses the financial aspects of a repre-
120. The client is also barred from remaining silent under oath despite
Aquinas's distinction that "[i]t is one thing to withhold the truth, and another
to utter a falsehood." Id. By taking the oath, the witness owes a duty to tell the
truth; he would fail in his duty by both remaining silent and using discreet
language.
121. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1755.
122. See id. at para. 1755.
123. Luban, supra note 5, at 1021-22.
124. Id. at 1005.
125. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1259.
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sentation." ' 2 6  The lawyer must consider her audience in
determining exactly how to present the moral implications of a
particular client objective. Many clients likely would respond
positively to Luban's "matter-of-fact" approach; such an
approach should be used most frequently in order to avoid upset-
ting a client with uncomfortable religious discussions. However,
the lawyer might determine that discussing the issues in expressly
religious terms will be most effective with some clients. When
the lawyer is comfortable doing so, she might choose to adapt a
more "ministerial" approach which Luban seems to disdain. 127
I offer several methods by which the lawyer might handle a
client who feels compelled to use "discreet language" when mak-
ing statements under oath. First, I discuss some alternatives
which are unacceptable based on a model of legal ethics founded
in the lawyer's morality. I conclude with two methods that the
Christian lawyer rightfully may choose in her attempt to act con-
sistently with her religion's moral tradition.
First, the lawyer might consider sacrificing her morals to
serve her client and instruct him to give the misleading state-
ment. "One might.., recognize that the profession requires one
to be prepared to violate one's moral convictions and thereby
jeopardize (or in a more heroic vein, sacrifice) one's moral integ-
rity."'12 Professor Gerald J. Postema criticizes this approach,
however, because "it is incoherent to suggest that one can ever
be justified in sacrificing one's moral integrity.' 29 Postema
argues that, in order for moral sacrifice to be justified, one of two
conditions must exist. Either the moral principles which the law-
yer violates are mistaken and should be abandoned, or the prin-
ciples are valid but are outweighed by the val, of the cause for
which they were sacrificed. 130
"Sacrifice" is not justifiable because in neither case is a real
sacrifice made. First, the moral principles discussed so far in this
article, which determine the attorney's moral accountability,
likely are not mistaken; they are established doctrines of the
Catholic Church coupled with reasoned analysis of prominent
legal and religious scholars. Second, there is no greater good
126. Luban, supra note 5, at 1026 (citation omitted).
127. See id. Such an approach could include reading from pertinent
scripture during client meetings or praying with the client for spiritual gui-
dance. Let me be clear: this approach should only be used where the lawyer is
comfortable and is certain that the approach will be most effective with the
particular client. I envision that this approach rarely would be appropriate.
128. Postema, supra note 5, at 289.
129. Id. at 290.
130. See id.
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than the objective moral norms which support the determination
of the lawyer's moral culpability. "The natural law is written and
engraved in the soul of each and every man .... But this com-
mand of human reason would not have the force of law if it were
not the voice and interpreter of a higher reason to which our
spirit and our freedom must be submitted."' The commands
of the natural law cannot be overridden by concerns of public
policy or individual interest.
Second, the lawyer might decide on a more extreme course
of action (at least from a conventional legal ethics point of view)
and withdraw from representation entirely. Withdrawal clearly
would remove the lawyer from the moral dilemma she would
encounter were the representation still in effect. This solution,
however, still is not desirable because "[i]t tends to negate the
importance of the lawyer's role as counselor and advisor."13 2 In
that role, the Catholic lawyer is in the best possible position to
ensure that the potential evil does not occur. By terminating
representation, the lawyer forces the client to seek other repre-
sentation, possibly from an attorney who might not care to pre-
vent the client from making the misleading statement. In order
to best serve the client as a counselor whose faith is rooted in
objective morality, the lawyer should continue to represent the
client and -employ one of the following morally-justifiable
options.
First, the lawyer could give advice that will ensure she coop-
erates with the client only materially if the client chooses to give
misleading testimony. 33 This option appeals for two reasons.
First, it is in accord with-or at least represents an honest
attempt to be in accord with-a reasonable understanding of
Catholic doctrine. Second, this option minimizes the likelihood
that the client will make the misleading statement by depriving
the client of the lawyer's direct assistance ("coaching").
The problem with this position is that it is difficult to apply.
The lawyer must carefully analyze each individual case and
131. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1954.
132. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' ETHICS 115 n.21
(1990). Katz writes:
[The lawyer] should, perhaps, make an attempt to handle the client in
terms of the whole man rather than in terms of his legal problems. In
this way he would be coming closer to a religious ideal of putting his
relationship with his fellow man on a basis of love and mercy rather
than justice or, particularly, legality.
Katz, supra note 54, at 937.
133. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text for explanation of how
the lawyer would cooperate materially.
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ensure that she does not provide her client with tactical informa-
tion that will aid the client in accomplishing an immoral objec-
tive. She must decide in each case whether she is excused from
advising the client based on the extent of her material coopera-
tion. If properly applied, this option enables a lawyer to effec-
tively represent her clients, remain faithful to her moral beliefs,
and prevent the client from acting immorally.
This first option is most in accord with characteristics of a
model presented by Professors Thomas Shaffer and Robert
Cochran which focuses on the goodness of the client as well as the
lawyer. "Maybe a true advocate considers all of the aspects of the
client's life, including the client's relationships with others, in
determining how to approach the client, in determining, in fact,
what the client's interests are. " "' This is an expression of the
Catholic commandment that one love one's neighbor. "[A]s
Martin Buber taught, the moral life centers in relationships with
other people." '135 The morally-conscious lawyer believes that she
best serves her client by concerning herself with the morality
involved in the client's choices. She indeed loves her neighbor
as she does herself by enlightening him to the same high moral
standard that she has set for herself.
The second option for the Catholic lawyer is also the most
radical: civil disobedience. The lawyer who chooses the previous
option, but whose client insists that the lawyer assist him in
presenting legally true but misleading testimony, might be forced
to confront this option if she is sued for malpractice or disci-
plined for failing to provide the client with "zealous" representa-
tion. "In a civil disobedience model, the penalty is not
suspended. The individual attorney [violates . e rules of profes-
sional ethics] and can state publicly the reasons for her
(mis)conduct or explain why the norms are wrong or inconsis-
tent with her religious beliefs, then accepts whatever penalty the
disciplinary committee assesses." '136
This model is attractive because the lawyer nobly attempts to
bring the human law into greater accord with the natural law.137
"If rulers were to enact unjust laws or take measures contrary to
the moral order, such arrangements would not be binding in
134. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS,
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 42-43 (1994); see also Luban, supra note 5, at 1005
n.8 ("Moral activism is an unabashedly interventionist ideal that aims to make
legal practice a positive moral force in society rather than-as in the standard
conception of the lawyer's role-a mere conduit of the client's will.").
135. SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 134, at 44.
136. Griffin, supra note 6, at 1259-60.
137. See CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1959.
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conscience. In such a case, 'authority breaks down completely
and results in shameful abuse.'"13 By publicly adhering to a
higher moral standard than that set by the profession, the lawyer
attempts to remedy the "shameful abuse" which occurred when
the profession adopted the unjust regulation.
However, the lawyer should, and undoubtedly will, view this
option as a last resort. It should only be considered a possibility
where the lawyer absolutely cannot adhere simultaneously to
legal standards and moral imperatives. If the lawyer chooses civil
disobedience too often, she risks losing her license if the bar
refuses to tolerate her repeated dissention. If she works in a law
firm, her choices might negatively affect the prosperity of the
firm. 1
3 9
This outcome is not undesirable simply because the lawyer
and her firm experience economic misfortune. Of equal or
greater concern is that the legal profession sanctions a lawyer
who practices in accord with her faith and who might be discour-
aged in the future from challenging the profession's standards
with her beliefs. "'It is preferable that each power be balanced
by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which
keep it within proper bounds. This is the principle of the "rule
of law," in which the law is sovereign and not the arbitrary will of
men.'"140 If the lawyer chooses civil disobedience, she should do
so only in extreme circumstances and should ensure that her dis-
138. Id. at para. 1903 (quotingJOHN XXIII, supra note 60, at para. 51); see
also id. at para. 1902.
139. Contrast this with the outcome of Hoyt Moore's case, discussed supra
notes 44-45 and accompanying text. He clearly violated both moral and legal
rules, was indicted, and in the end was vindicated-even praised-by the bar and
his law firm.
St. Thomas More provides the ultimate example of a lawyer who chose civil
disobedience over compelled compliance with an unjust order from his sover-
eign. Sir Thomas disagreed with King Henry VIII on several issues, most nota-
bly divorce and the supremacy of the Pope in the Roman Catholic Church. Sir
Thomas refused to take the "Oath of Supremacy" acknowledging Henry VIII as
head of the Church. More was imprisoned in the Tower of London for refusing
to take the oath. Indeed, More refused to adopt a morality based on the sover-
eign's commands. Sir Thomas was tried and convicted of treason on July 1,
1535, and beheaded on Tower Hill five days later. See 9 NEW CATHOLIC ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 1138-39 (The Catholic University of America ed., 1967).
The Archbishop of Canterbury had given Sir Thomas express permission
to accede to the king's order, but More refused. Professor Noonan para-
phrased Sir Thomas's words: "Well, I will have very few moral problems if I can
always resolve doubts by letting the King's order decide them." Noonan, supra
note 44, at 239.
140. CATECHISM, supra note 51, at para. 1904 (quoting JOHN PAUL II,
CENTESIMus ANNUS para. 44 (1991)).
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obedience has a significant impact on the profession and its ethi-
cal standards.
CONCLUSION
Secular legal ethics often fails to proscribe conduct which
would be immoral from a Christian perspective. Those lawyers
who strive to make morally-sound choices in all facets of their
lives require more guidance than the legal profession provides;
they find this guidance in moral guidelines set by the Catholic
Church and in reasoned scholarly analyses consistent with those
guidelines. Whether a lawyer is morally accountable for advising
a client to offer legally true but misleading statements under
oath is one specific dilemma in which legal guidance is insuffi-
cient. Christian morality offers a complex but comprehensible
solution to the dilemma.
In order to solve the problem, the lawyer must answer two
questions. First, is the attorney morally accountable for the
actions her client takes based on the attorney's advice? Second,
does the client act immorally when he makes a misleading state-
ment under oath? The morally-conscious lawyer answers both
questions affirmatively. She rejects positivism, skepticism, and
role morality as feasible approaches, and she recognizes that she
is morally accountable for the client's actions if she cooperates in
them. Whereas she always is accountable for cooperating either
formally or materially and immediately, she may avoid responsi-
bility if she cooperates only materially and mediately. The more
remote her cooperation, the less compelling her excuse must be.
The lawyer understands that she will be accountable only if
the client's actions are immoral. According to Church teaching,
the goodness of an act depends on the object chosen, the client's
intention, and the attending circumstances. Regardless of the
client's intention and the surrounding circumstances, the client's
act is entirely vitiated if the object is inherently immoral.
Because the legally true but misleading statement is untruthful, is
made with intent to lead the questioner into error, and is made
by the client who is under a duty to communicate the truth, the
statement is a lie. The object of the client's action and the entire
act itself therefore are inherently immoral.
The lawyer must choose a course of action which enables
her to act in accord with her moral standards. If, when repre-
sentation begins, the lawyer determines that the client might
have the opportunity to respond to an ambiguous question with
a misleading answer, the lawyer should advise her client in a lim-
ited manner to ensure that the lawyer cooperates as materially,
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mediately, and remotely as possible. By considering the factors
explicated above, she might find that her otherwise immoral
advice is excusable in her particular situation. By advising the
client that he need not volunteer information which is not
requested, but ensuring him that he must answer any question
with the "whole truth," the lawyer leads the client toward legally
and morally correct behavior.
The lawyer should be able to provide sufficient advice to sat-
isfy the client. If, however, the client does not accept the lawyer's
advice, the lawyer will be faced with a choice: assent to or refuse
to assist in the client's proposed course of conduct. The latter
likely will have undesirable consequences. If the lawyer contin-
ues to represent the client throughout the case, and if the result
is unfavorable to the client, then the lawyer might be sued for
malpractice or sanctioned by the bar. If the lawyer chooses to
assist the client in making the misleading statement, then the
lawyer must accept the consequences of an immoral act.
Although it is likely immoral, the lawyer still might find this
option appealing if she determines that remaining free from
malpractice suits and sanctions will enable her to have opportu-
nities in the future to advise clients in accord with her values.
Clearly, no simple solution to the dilemma exists. However,
the lawyer who makes informed decisions based on her Christian
morality demonstrates her love for God and her neighbor. She
should not view her conflicting obligations as a burden but
rather as a sacrifice that will ultimately bring the human and
divine laws in greater accord. The lawyer should strive to make
decisions that may one day effect changes in the legal system and
make its precepts coterminous with those of her morality.
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